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NOTES
GRAND JURY SECRECY
v. THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
A CASE FOR PRESS INTERVIEWS
OF GRAND JURORS
"Any experienced prosecutor will admit that he can indict any-
body at any time for almost anything before any grand jury."
-Former U.S. District Court Judge William Campbell
I. INTRODUCTION
A citizen who serves as a grand juror must take an oath, swearing to
keep secret all matters that occur before the grand jury.' A breach of this
oath may result in a contempt action.2 Yet the extent of the secrecy prohi-
bition is unclear. A grand juror receives no guidance from the oath taken
regarding the duration of the secrecy requirement.3 Therefore the question
arises when, if ever, may a grand juror discuss the proceedings with the
1. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) contains the general rule of grand jury secrecy followed
by the federal courts. The majority of states have secrecy provisions modeled after the federal
rule. The text of the oath has changed remarkably little since the 17th century. S. BEALE &
W. BRYSON, I GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:02, at 3 (1986) [hereinafter BEALE &
BRYSON]. The oath taken by grand jurors in the federal system, which is similar to the oath
prescribed by statute or rule in most states, reads as follows:
Do you, and each of you, solemnly swear that you shall diligently inquire into and make
true presentment or indictment of all such matters and things as shall be given you in
charge or otherwise come to your knowledge, touching your grand jury service; to keep
secret the counsel of the United States, your fellows and yourselves; not to present or
indict any person through hatred, malice or ill will; nor leave any person unpresented on
unindicted through fear, favor, or affection, nor for any reward, or hope or promise
thereof; but in all your presentments and indictments to present the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, to the best of your skill and understanding? If so, an-
swer I do.
Id. at § 5:11.
2. United States v. Stone, 633 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 1979).
3. See supra note 1.
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press?4
A survey of the conflicting case law on the issue almost certainly would
leave a juror confused.5 Decisions have held both that secrecy is not limited
by time and circumstance,' and that secrecy is no longer necessary when
the grand jury has been discharged and the accused apprehended.7 This
confusion has produced an unacceptable chilling effect on the press' first
amendment freedoms, since communication between the press and a grand
juror could result in a contempt action.8 The solution is the formation of a
judicial test that protects and balances the purposes and goals of grand jury
secrecy and first amendment rights, and at the same time protects grand
jurors and press members from contempt actions for secrecy violations.
Both the grand jury and the free press have aided the pursuit of jus-
tice. Operating in secret, the grand jury is a judicial tool uniquely capable
of making investigations and bringing indictments. 9 Thriving on publicity,
the free press is an equally important feature of a justice-minded, demo-
cratic society. A free press helps to preserve the fairness of judicial proceed-
ings and can report on abuses in the judicial system.' 0 The secrecy sur-
rounding grand jury proceedings, however, has curtailed the press' ability to
carry out its watchdog function. Grand jury secrecy is not absolute," nor is
freedom of speech.' But it is essential that the press knows what, if any,
contact with grand jurors is permitted, so that the press may enjoy the full
extent of its first amendment rights and thereby continue to keep a watch-
ful eye on the judiciary.
4. The term "press," as used throughout this note, is not limited to newspapers and
the reporters they employ. "Press" should be interpreted broadly and refers generally to all
types of journalists in the media, including but not limited to radio and television reporters.
5. See infra notes 165-79 and accompanying text.
6. United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 26 F. Supp. 429, 430 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
7. Atwell v. United States, 162 F. 97 (4th Cir. 1908).
8. United States v. Stone, 633 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 1979).
9. No instrument other than the grand jury can so effectively cope "with organized
crime, which cuts across state lines, conspiracies to overthrow the government of the United
States, or alleged deviations from rectitude by those who have been entrusted by the govern-
ment with public trust." United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 290 (N.D. Cal. 1952). "As
an engine of discovery against organized and far-reaching crime, the grand jury has no coun-
terpart." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1933).
10. THE UNIVERSITY OF MAss. PRESS, MEDIA & THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN A FREE
SocIETY 210 (1973) [hereinafter MEDIA & THE FIRST AMENDMENT]. "There are two impor-
tant reasons for allowing the press to report on courtroom proceedings. First, this activity is
protected by the first amendment. Second, the press helps to preserve fairness of judicial pro-
ceedings, since scrutiny by news media may keep trial participants honest." Id.
11. In re Grand Jury Matter, 682 F.2d 61, 63 (3rd Cir. 1982). See also infra notes
119-29 and accompanying text.
12. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Gitlow v. United States, 268 U.S.
652 (1925).
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In recognition of the utility of both free speech and the grand jury, the
Constitution explicitly embraces each as a protection of liberty. The fifth
amendment to the Constitution provides that "No person shall be held to
answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment of
a grand jury."' 3 The grand jury originated in England 4 and was adopted as
part of the criminal justice process in the American colonies.' 5 Deeply
rooted in the history of the grand jury is the concept of secrecy.' 6 Using a
plain meaning interpretation of the federal secrecy requirement, all matters
occurring before the grand jury are to be kept secret.' 7
On the other hand, the first amendment to the Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press."' 8 The protection of free speech and freedom of the press in
the first amendment is vital for the successful operation of our democratic
form of government.' 9 Recognizing these fundamental freedoms, the Su-
preme Court has extended constitutional protection beyond those situations
envisioned by the framers of the Bill of Rights.' 0 Following the Supreme
Court's lead, most courts have imposed few restrictions on the press,"' re-
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The amendment states in full:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service or in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id.
Despite the langauge of the fifth amendment, in 1859 Michigan became the first state to
allow prosecutors to bring felony prosecutions by way of information rather than grand jury
indictment. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 616 (1985) [hereinafter LAFAVE
& ISRAEL]. This process of a judge finding probable cause rather than requiring grand jury
indictment was upheld as a proper safeguard of the defendant's rights in Hurtado v. Califor-
nia, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
14. R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL 1 (1963).
15. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 348.
16. See supra note 1. For additional discussion of the origins of grand jury secrecy, see
infra notes 32-35, 57-61, and accompanying text.
17. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) imposes an obligation of secrecy on "all matters occurring
before the grand jury."
18. U.S. CONsT. amend I. The amendment states in full: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances." Id.
19. D. BOGEN, BULWARK OF LIBERTY: THE COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 10
(1984).
20. MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 10, at 17. One obvious example is
that first amendment protections have been expanded to cover the electronic media of radio
and television, which did not exist when the first amendment was drafted. Id.
21. Sharp, Postverdict Interrogation of Jurors by the Press: Is the First Amendment
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sulting in broad media access to judicial proceedings.2"
Freedom of expression, however, is not absolute, and the press has not
enjoyed unchecked access to all judicial proceedings."3 In particular, tradi-
tional press freedoms have receded when conflicts have arisen in connection
with grand juries.24 The secrecy requirements involved in grand jury pro-
ceedings have been used to prevent media access to grand jury matters."
The press does not have a clear first amendment right to interview grand
jurors,26 and this prohibition extends indefinitely after the grand jurors have
been discharged. As one judge commented on Rule 6(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, "the law in this area is largely untested, cer-
tainly unsettled, and unclear in many respects."2 7 The resulting chilling ef-
fect on the press hampers the media's ability to serve as a judicial watchdog
and in turn tarnishes public support and confidence in the courts.
This note will discuss the conflict between the first amendment and the
secrecy surrounding grand juries and analyze whether grand jury secrecy
can validly be held to prohibit the media from interviewing grand jurors,
particularly after the jury has been discharged. Further, this note will focus
on the history, purposes, and origins of grand juries, the reasons for secrecy,
whether these reasons justify total denial of press access, and the numerous
abuses spawned by this secrecy requirement. 8 Also, this note will trace the
growth of the free press, the related benefits and drawbacks of this growth,
and the increasing acceptance of the press by the judiciary.29 After explor-
ing the overall conflict between press freedoms and grand jury secrecy, a
modification of grand jury secrecy will be suggested that would allow for
possible media interviews of grand jurors upon completion of grand jury
proceedings.30 Such a modification would refresh public confidence in the
Absolute?, 27 REs GESTAE 380, 384 (1984).
22. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). For a discussion of the
facts and holding of Nebraska Press Ass'n, see supra notes 144-45.
23. Id.
24. Because of the secrecy provisions, the press is not allowed access to the grand jury
room when proceedings are in session. Transcripts of proceedings are not made available to the
press either. For a discussion of disclosure of grand jury transcripts, see generally Douglas Oil
Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979); United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,
356 U.S. 677 (1958).
25. United States v. Providence Tribune Co., 241 F. 524, 526 (D.R.I. 1917)(the press'
acts of publishing information of what occurred before the grand jury, including information
that certain persons were under investigation and the identification of witnesses, was punisha-
ble as contempt).
26. See infra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
27. United States v. Tager, 506 F. Supp. 707, 709 (D. Kan. 1979)(Theis, C.J.).
28. See infra notes 32-45, 62-93 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 98-162 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 189-202 and accompanying text.
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grand jury process,31 while also creating accountability in a system where it
is long overdue.
II. HISTORY OF THE GRAND JURY
A. Origins and Purpose
The grand jury originated in England in 1166.11 Secrecy was not an
element of the early grand juries. Rather, deliberations were open to the
public, and the grand jury functioned solely in the interest of the Crown.33
Not until 1368, under the name of le graunde inquest, did the grand jury
adopt the custom of hearing witnesses in private.34 This process developed
largely to protect jurors and witnesses from royal officials displeased with
the jury's outcome, not to aid the prosecution in its discovery of facts or to
protect the prosecutor's case from disclosure.-5
The American grand jury is a direct descendant of this English institu-
tion."6 This historical nexus is evidenced by the fact that many questions
involving the modern grand jury are answered, at least in part, by looking
to the historical role the grand jury played in England.37 In England, accu-
sations were initiated in two ways: either by the jurors themselves acting on
the basis of their own knowledge, or by a representative of the Crown who
produced witnesses to testify in support of a particular charge.38 Under
their power of presentment,39 English grand juries could and did investigate
31. For a discussion of abuses in the grand jury process, see infra notes 83-93 and
accompanying text.
32. Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REV. 455, at 456 (1965). According to
LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 347, "The grand jury commonly is traced back to the
Assize of Clarendon, issued in 1166, although some historians find earlier antecedents in insti-
tutions utilized by the Anglo-Saxons, Normans, and even the Athenians. The assize was a
crucial element in the efforts of Henry II to wrest the administration of justice away from the
courts of the feudal barons." Id.
33. Calkins, supra note 32, at 456. Acting as a type of public prosecutor, the early
grand jury was formed to augment the power of the crown. Id. at 457.
34. Id. at 457.
35. Id. at 456. Note that the fifth amendment, which contains the grand jury provision,
does not mention secrecy. See supra note 13 for the entire text of the fifth amendment.
36. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 1, § 1:01, at 1.
37. Id. For further discussion of this view, see Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273
(1919).
38. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 348.
39. Application of United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). A "presentment" is an accusation initiated by the grand jury and may be
regarded as instructions to the prosecutor for an indictment. An "indictment" is an accusation,
usually prepared by the prosecutor, which is endorsed by the grand jury when it finds a "true
bill." Id. Both presentments and indictments are specific accusations of crime which are
presented to the court. Id. at 863, n.13.
1989]
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any matter that appeared to them to involve a violation of the law.'0 De-
spite its historical significance, however, the grand jury was abolished in
England in 1933.41
The early function of American grand juries was to institute prosecu-
tions for serious crimes in the colonies.42 In addition, grand juries became
aware of the needs for reform, and occasionally they managed to stir public
officials to action by issuing presentments.' 3 Other early functions of grand
juries helped to win public support for the grand jury system. For example,
during the Revolutionary period the grand jury proved to be an effective
means of preventing unpopular royal prosecutions, thus enhancing the
jury's reputation as an important procedural safeguard.4 4 As a result of the
favorable experience of using grand juries during the Colonial and Revolu-
tionary periods, the fifth amendment to the Constitution and similar provi-
sions in many state constitutions were adopted containing grand jury
provisions. 5
These provisions have since been codified at both the federal and state
levels. Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure embodies the
concept of grand juries into the federal court system. Rule 6(a) states sim-
ply that "the court shall order one or more grand juries to be summoned at
such times as the public interest requires.' 46 Individual states have passed
their own statutes to govern the existence and function of grand juries, and
these statutes generally are modeled upon the federal rules.47
In many respects the modern grand jury resembles its judicial ances-
tors, although jurors today are less independent and tend to rely more on
the discretion of the critical actor in the grand jury process, the prosecuting
attorney. 8 At common law, twenty-three persons traditionally were em-
paneled as grand jurors. Today the federal system allows the number of
grand jurors to fluctuate between sixteen and twenty-three. 49 Twelve votes
40. R. YOUNGER, supra note 14.
41. Calkins, supra note 32, at 469. The grand jury was abolished by The Administra-
tion of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 1, largely for
economic reasons, following a decline in the importance of the grand jury. Id. at 469 n.50.
42. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 1, § 1:01, at 2.
43. R. YOUNGER, supra note 14, at 17.
44. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 1, § 1:01, at 2.
45. Id.
46. The Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 6(a) emphasize that the rule vests in the
court full discretion as to the number of grand juries to be summoned and as to the times
when they should be convened. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a) advisory committee's note.
47. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-34-2-1 to -15 (West 1986).
48. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 1, § 6:02, at 4.
49. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(g) governs the length of grand jury service. The rule states that
generally no grand jury may serve more than 18 months, and during that period jurors may be
excused either temporarily or permanently. Id.
[Vol. 23
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are necessary for indictment in the federal system,50 but the votes necessary
for indictment by state grand juries vary. 51 Technical rules of evidence are
not followed,5 2 allowing the prosecutor more freedom to influence the out-
come through the use of hearsay and other evidence potentially inadmissi-
ble at trial.53 The grand jury still retains its traditional dual functions of
investigating and indicting." Attendance at grand jury proceedings gener-
ally is strictly limited by statute,55 and no judge or other judicial officer
presides over the daily operations of the grand jury. The lack of a judicial
officer contributes to the modern grand jury's dependency on the prosecu-
tor, since the prosecutor works closely with the grand jury on a day-to-day
basis.56
B. Secrecy and Its Abuse
The fifth amendment to the Constitution encompasses the requirement
of indictment by grand jury, yet the amendment is silent on the issue of
50. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(b)(2). Most American jurisdictions slowly have shifted toward
smaller grand juries and allow for less than unanimous vote for indictment. LAFAVE & ISRAEL,
supra note 13, at 359.
51. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 1, § 2:04, at 23.
52. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 1, § 1:06, at 32. Of course, state grand jury provi-
sions may vary from the federal system.
53. But see infra note 56 (regarding the American Bar Association's standards of con-
duct for prosecutors). See also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956)(holding a de-
fendant could be required to stand trial, and a conviction could be sustained even if only
hearsy evidence was presented to the grand jury that indicted him). The fact that the press
may learn of this hearsay-type information later through interviews with grand jurors should
not be considered when deciding whether to allow such interviews. This is because the press
routinely is allowed to remain in the courtroom during criminal and civil trials and hear poten-
tially inadmissible evidence entertained by the presiding judge outside the jury's presence.
54. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 1, § 1:07, at 35. The "sword and shield" analogy
often has been used to describe these two functions of the grand jury. The jury acts as a shield
that protects the accused against unfounded and improperly motivated charges when the jury
screens cases to determine whether sufficient evidentiary support exists for indictment. The
grand jury acts as a sword that attacks criminal conduct when an investigation returns an
indictment. Id.
55. For example, FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d), which governs who may be present while a
federal grand jury is in session, states:
Attorneys for the government, the witness under examination, interpreters when needed
and, for the purpose of taking the evidence, a stenographer or operator of a recording
device may be present while the grand jury is in session, but no person other than the
jurors may be present while the grand jury is deliberating or voting.
Id.
56. See American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution
Function, Standard 3-36(b) (2d ed. 1982). The American Bar Association's Standards for the
Prosecution Function states that the prosecutor "should not make statements or arguments in
an effort to influence grand jury action in a manner that would be impermissible at trial before
a petit jury." Id.
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secrecy. 57 Nevertheless, grand jurors are sworn to secrecy.58 Rule 6(e) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly imposes a secrecy obli-
gation upon grand jurors, attorneys for the government, government person-
nel assisting the attorney for the government, and officers of the court. 59 No
obligation of secrecy, however, may be imposed on any person except in
accordance with this rule.60 Individual states, with some modifications, gen-
erally follow the federal provisions, although three states have no specific
secrecy provisions. 61
Today there are four reasons generally put forth as to why the secrecy
of grand jury proceedings should be guarded. First, grand jurors should be
free from the apprehension that might result if jurors knew that their opin-
ions and votes might later be disclosed.6 2 Second, secrecy could aid the state
in securing willing witnesses if the witnesses are free from the apprehension
that their testimony may be subsequently disclosed. 3 Third, providing the
accused who actually is guilty with information about the grand jury pro-
ceedings might allow the accused to flee arrest," suborn false testimony, or
tamper with government witnesses.6 5 Finally, secrecy can assure that a per-
son falsely accused does not suffer public embarrassment if the grand jury
refuses to indict and the nature of the investigation is not disclosed. 6
Despite the valid reasons for secrecy, grand jurors can have contact
with the press without undermining these reasons or destroying the effec-
tiveness of grand juries. In support of this proposition, it is notable that
exceptions to grand jury secrecy currently in existence already make some
disclosure possible. 7 For example, federal rules do not restrict disclosure of
a witness's own grand jury testimony. 8 In addition, disclosure of grand jury
transcripts is allowed where the need for such disclosure outweighs the pub-
lic interest in secrecy.69 In contrast to grand jurors, no obligation of secrecy
57. See supra note 13 (the entire text of the fifth amendment).
58. See supra note 1.
59. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
60. Id.
61. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 1, § 7:04, at 15. The states that have no specific
secrecy provisions are Alabama, Connecticut, and New Hampshire. Id.
62. Calkins, supra note 32, at 458. See also Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops North-
west, 441 U.S. 211 (1979); United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
63. See supra note 62.
64. See supra note 62. Most likely this would occur where the accused learns through
publicity of his indictment and, acting upon this knowledge, flees the jurisdiction before he can
be apprehended.
65. See supra note 62.
66. See supra note 62.
67. See infra notes 166-76 and accompanying text.
68. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 610 F.2d 202, 217 (5th Cir. 1980). It should be
noted, however, that unlike grand jurors, witnesses are not sworn to secrecy.
69. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
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may be imposed upon grand jury witnesses. Witnesses may be interviewed
by the press or others after their appearance before the grand jury and
repeat what they said or relate any knowledge they have on the subject of
inquiry.70 Thus, allowing the press to interview grand jurors would not be
the first blow to grand jury secrecy, but instead would merely be a widening
of permissible disclosures, which is not prohibited by the Constitution.
A second argument against these secrecy justifications is made through
an analogy between grand jurors and ordinary trial or "petit jurors."'
Many of the concerns given for imposing secrecy on grand jury proceedings,
such as the need to avoid juror apprehension and to secure willing wit-
nesses, have been addressed in the trial jury setting. The press has been
granted widespread access to most judicial proceedings, 2 and trial jurors
are increasingly subjected to postverdict interviews. 3 Obviously, this judi-
cial access makes it possible for the press to interfere with the administra-
tion of justice. 74 Grand jurors, however, should not feel any more apprehen-
sion from publicity than do ordinary trial jurors. The functions of grand
jurors are limited to investigation and indictment. 75 Unlike petit jurors,
grand jurors never assess liability, determine damages, or convict defend-
ants. More serious consequences can result when a petit jury returns a ver-
dict against a defendant, such as a lengthy prison term or even capital pun-
70. In re Vescovo Special Grand Jury, 473 F. Supp. 1335, 1336 (C.D. Cal. 1979). Of
course a distinction exists in that the witnesses, unlike the grand jurors themselves, are not
decision makers.
71. A petit jury, or trial jury as it is more commonly known, is the ordinary jury of up
to twelve people, selected for the trial of a criminal or civil matter. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
768 (5th ed. 1979). The analogy between grand juries and petit juries is not infallible. Differ-
ences between the two juries obviously exist. One important difference is that petit juries are
supposed to hear only admissible evidence against those whom there is sufficient, credible evi-
dence to bring an indictment. But potentially embarrassing, inadmissible evidence may be re-
vealed during a petit jury trial, and the press may publish any scrap of information it can
learn. R. HOLSINGER, MEDIA LAW 252 (1987). In addition, not all trials result in convictions.
By analogy, this weakens the argument in favor of prohibiting grand jury interviews, since
publication of information concerning the innocent accused already occurs in the petit jury
setting.
72. Sharp, supra note 21, at 384. Any general injunction against postverdict interroga-
tion of jurors must be approached "with the greatest care and caution in light of the First
Amendment free press values involved." Id. at 385.
73. Note, Public Disclosure of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARV. L. REv. 886, 887 (1983).
[S]oliciting from jurors the inside story of their deliberations seems more widespread
today than ever before. Postverdict requests by litigants to interview jurors are granted in
a small but growing number of cases. More strikingly, the media-buoyed by recent
decisions affirming the legitimacy of their presence in the courtroom---continue to test the
limits of their right to gather and print news about all aspects of the judicial system,
including the deliberation of juries.
Id.
74. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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ishment. Thus, any apprehension felt by grand jurors should not exceed the
apprehension felt by trial jurors, who routinely are subjected to postverdict
interviews.
Attempting to justify grand jury secrecy from the defendant's view-
point, such as the protection of individuals groundlessly accused, is uncon-
vincing.76 Grand jury secrecy is not designed for the benefit of the defend-
ant.77 In England, the argument that the grand jury might protect the
accused from oppression was not convincing enough to keep the grand jury
from being abolished.7 8 In America, the press routinely reports on individu-
als named in lawsuits or charged with criminal offenses, despite the fact
that many of these actions do not result in the assessment of liability or a
criminal conviction. 79 Perhaps this reporting occurs partly because our judi-
cial system is founded on the concept that everyone is innocent until proven
guilty. 0 A grand jury indictment is nothing more than an accusation.81 Ob-
viously some individuals ignore this concept. When all considerations are
taken into account, however, the attempted protection of falsely accused
individuals is insufficient to warrant maintaining such a hard line on se-
crecy that press interviews of grand jurors are forever prohibited.
Critics of the grand jury argue that secrecy requirements are only min-
imally effective because of the many loopholes and exceptions to the re-
quirements, and they contend that even where secrecy is effective, it can
stifle public awareness of grand jury practices.82 One of the major reasons
for advocating press access to grand jurors is to combat the well-docu-
mented and numerous instances of abuse that strict secrecy has produced."
The grand jury, often esteemed as a bulwark of freedom, is commonly and
unethically manipulated by prosecutors in order to benefit his or her own
personal motives.84
76. See infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
77. Howard v. State, 60 Ga. 229, 4 S.E.2d 418, 423 (1939).
78. Every day, for example, American newspapers print stories about individuals who
have been arrested, despite the fact that the person has been convicted of nothing and is pre-
sumed innocent until proven guilty. More specifically, many newspapers print "police records,"
a brief listing of the names and addresses of people arrested the previous day, as well as the
initial charge involved.
79. See generally ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL (1947).
80. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2511, at 530 (1981).
81. United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 907 (1952).
82. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 356. It must be kept in mind that this note
does not advocate removing the secrecy element from grand jury proceedings. Rather, the
thrust of the argument is that grand jury secrecy needs to be clarified to avoid creating an
absolute ban to media interviews of grand jurors once jurors have fulfilled their grand jury
functions.
83. See infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
84. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, REPRESENTATION OF WITNESSES BEFORE FEDERAL
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Fueling this frequent abuse is the fact that grand jury misconduct is
extremely difficult to detect and prove, 85 at least partly because of secrecy.
Any conduct that exceeds the limits set by the Constitution, statutes, case
law, or court rules is an abuse of the function of the grand jury.8" Recogniz-
ing the potential for abuse, Supreme Court Justice Douglas included in a
dissent former U.S. District Court Judge William Campbell's telling state-
ment: "Any experienced prosecutor will admit that he can indict anybody
at any time for almost anything before any grand jury."87 Thus, secrecy is a
tempting invitation to prosecutors to indict whomever they choose and
thereby make a mockery of justice.88
Recognizing these problems, the Supreme Court has stated that the
Constitution should not tolerate the transformation of the grand jury into
an instrument of oppression.89 This warning has not stopped the abuses.90
GRAND JURIES, National Lawyers Guild, § 12.1, at 2 (1987) [hereinafter REPRESENTATION OF
WITNESSES]. For example, the grand jury is particularly subject to abuse by public office hold-
ers during periods of political dissent. Id. at n.3.
85. United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 432 (1983).
86. REPRESENTATION OF WITNESSES, supra note 84, § 12:1, at 3.
87. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973)(Douglas, J., dissenting)(quoting
former U.S. District Court Judge William Campbell). Justice Douglas' dissent was especially
critical of the grand jury, which in Mara was used to compel the target of a grand jury investi-
gation to furnish handwriting samples or be held in contempt of court. Id. at 19.
88. M'Kinney v. United States, 199 F. 25, 31 (8th Cir. 1912)(Sanborn, J., dissenting).
Judge Sanborn's dissent is a stinging condemnation of the abuse of grand jury secrecy. The
dissent states in part:
It is a serious thing for any man be indicted for an infamous crime. Whether innocent or
guilty he cannot escape the ignominy of the accusation, the dangers of perjury and error
at his trial, the torture of suspense and the pains of imprisonment, or the burden of bail.
The secrecy in any judicial procedure is a tempting invitation to the malicious, the ambi-
tious, and the reckless to try to use it to benefit themselves and their friends and to
punish their enemies. If malicious, ambitious, or over-zealous men, either in or out of
office, may with impunity persuade grand juries without any legal evidence, either by
hearsay testimony, undue influence, or worse means, to indict whom they will, and there
is no way in which the courts may annul such illegal accusations, the grand jury, instead
of that protection of "the citizen against unfounded accusation, whether it comes from
government or be prompted by partisan passion, or private enmity," which it was primar-
ily designed to provide, may become an engine of oppression and a mockery of justice.
Id.
89. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 12 (1972)(holding the grand jury could re-
quire targets of its investigation to submit voice samples for comparison with other evidence in
the possession of the grand jury).
90. For examples of this abuse, see generally REPRESENTATION OF WITNESSES, supra
note 84, § 12.4-13.4 (1987). Typical of the abuses listed therein is what occurred in United
States v. Smith, 687 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1982). In Smith, two targets of a grand jury investiga-
tion were subpoenaed by the prosecutor without the grand jury's knowledge. The prosecutor
told the targets, who were not represented by counsel, that if they provided handwriting sam-
ples voluntarily they would not be required to testify before the grand jury. After providing the
handwriting samples, both witnesses were indicted and later convicted. An appeal of the con-
victions on the ground that the prosecutor was guilty of abuse was unsuccessful. Id. at 152.
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For example, grand jury investigations have been used to intimidate wit-
nesses. 91 Perhaps this is partly why the grand jury process has been criti-
cized as nothing more than a "rubber stamp" for the prosecutor's conclu-
sions of guilt.92 Even the Supreme Court, despite its warnings, is not
blameless for the failings of the grand jury system. Faced with a case that
could have sent a message to abusive prosecutors, the Supreme Court in-
stead held that a grand jury indictment based exclusively on hearsay was
valid.9"
With its broad investigative powers, however, the grand jury is seen as
an important tool in the enforcement of state and federal criminal laws.9
Perhaps because of this sweeping power there is mounting support for sig-
nificant changes in traditional grand jury procedure.9 5 "Critics of the grand
jury contend that major changes are necessary to strike the proper balance
between individual liberty and effective law enforcement."96 Accordingly,
there has been a clear trend on the part of the courts and legislatures to
relax the rigid rules of secrecy. 97
III. PRESS FREEDOMS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. The Growth and Importance of the Free Press
Freedom of speech is the heart of individual liberty98 and was de-
scribed by Justice Cardozo as "the matrix, the indispensible condition of
nearly every other form of freedom." 99 The press embodies the liberty of
Allowing press interviews of grand jurors would subject prosecutors' actions to public scrutiny,
and thus could curb the questionable prosecutorial conduct that occurred in Smith, as well as
other documented cases of serious misconduct.
91. United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
907 (1952).
92. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 356.
93. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956)(holding a grand jury indictment
based on credible hearsay is not subject to challenge).
94. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 1, § 1:09, at 39.
95. Reform proposals include: requiring grand jury witnesses to be advised of their
right to counsel and their privilege against self-incrimination; affording grand jury witnesses
the right to counsel during grand jury proceedings; limiting evidence that can be presented to
the grand jury; and limiting the grand jury's subpoena power. Id.
96. Id.
97. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 362. For example, grand jury transcripts are
more available today than in the past. Also, distinctions are now recognized between disclo-
sures after indictment and discharge of the jury, and disclosures that could affect future inves-
tigations. Further, in weighing the need for disclosure, courts and legislators now emphasize
the criminal defendant's need to obtain information that might point to acquittal. Id.
98. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 830 (3rd ed. 1986)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
99. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). Justice Cardozo is but one of
many justices who commented on the importance of free speech. Justice Black, dissenting in
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free speech unlike any other American institution. Without a free, in-
formed, and educated electorate, which the free press provides, democracy
cannot function.100 The increased protection afforded the press throughout
history has protected individuals from governmental oppression and pro-
duced a more democratic system of government. 01 The Constitution, it has
been said, was designed to keep government "off the backs of the peo-
pie."'' 02 By allowing for critical comment of the government, the free speech
and press provisions of the first amendment do just that.
A truly democratic society could not function without a free press be-
cause the cornerstone of a democratic society is the proposition that deci-
sions are based on full and open discussion of all points of view. 103 A free
press provides the medium for such communication. This open exchange of
ideas is not limited to praise for public officials, but necessarily includes
critical public commentary. The first amendment creates a sanctuary
around the citizen's beliefs,'04 whether these beliefs rain praise on govern-
ment or send a storm of public protest crashing against it. Honest and accu-
rate criticism of the government produces a greater public good in a democ-
racy than false respect fostered by suppression. 05 As noted by Justice
Brandeis in Whitney v. California, one of the benefits dervied from free
speech is a safety valve for society, whereby the cathartic release of speak-
ing out against the government helps curtail violent revolt.'06
The American press, however, had humble beginnings, and has not al-
ways enjoyed such freedom to criticize. Indeed, Colonial America did not
attempt to liberalize free speech even within its own communities. 07 Even
Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941), made
the analogy, "Freedom to speak and write about public questions is as important to the life of
our government as is the heart to the human body." Id. at 301-02. United States Supreme
Court Justices obviously are not the only people who have championed the causes of the free
press. John Milton, a blind poet and English literary giant, advocated freedom of the press in
his famous speech addressed to Parliament in Areopagitica. Areopagitica, composed in 1644,
became the classic literary defense in English of intellectual liberty and freedom of publica-
tion. J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA AND OF EDUCATION ix (G. Sabine ed. 1951).
100. Levy and Young, Foreward to H. NELSON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMIL-
TON TO THE WARREN COURT vii (1967).
101. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, concurring in the famous libel case New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), echoed the words of Thomas Jefferson by writing:
"I doubt that a country can live in freedom where its people can be made to suffer physically
or financially for criticizing their government, its actions, or its officials." Id. at 297.
102. W. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION 6 (1970).
103. D. BOGEN, supra note 19, at 30.
104. W. DOUGLAS, supra note 102, at 3.
105. D. BOGEN, supra note 19, at 26.
106. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)(Brandeis, J., concurring).
107. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 98, at 832. The communities of Colonial
America have been described as scattered, "closed enclaves," where persons of similar beliefs
would settle and together would oppress views that conflicted with their own. Id.
1989]
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after the celebrated trial of New York printer John Peter Zenger in
1735,108 the threat of prosecution under the doctrine of seditious libel 09 did
not vanish.110 The suppressive Alien and Sedition Acts, passed in 1798111
did not expire until 1801.112 Yet despite a revival of acts in the early 1900s
similar to the Alien and Sedition Acts, 113 a steady trend has developed to-
ward increasing press freedoms. The extent of these freedoms is a matter of
constantly evolving law. 14 As a result of this evolution, there is greater
freedom of the press today than at any time in our nation's history.11 5
In order to protect our society, press freedoms should be staunchly de-
fended, and the trend toward expanding these freedoms should continue.
One obvious area for expansion is to allow the press the right to interview
grand jurors. In light of the abuses grand jury secrecy has produced, 1 '
allowing these interviews would be consistent with one of the fundamental
purposes of freedom of expression and freedom of the press, which is to
serve as a watchdog against government abuse.
B. Judicial Acceptance of the Press
Difficult constitutional questions have arisen when the press has at-
tempted to pursue its fundamental watchdog purposes, particularly in the
context of press access to the courtroom.11 7 These problems, however, gen-
erally have been overcome in favor of the media.118 The attempt to balance
108. John Peter Zenger was the last person to be prosecuted for seditious libel in the
colonies. Id. Zenger's prosecutions resulted from a series of articles he published that criticized
the governor of New York. Id. Andrew Hamilton defended Zenger on the notion that truth
should be a defense to libel. Id. The defense was unsuccessful, though Hamilton's compelling
argument convinced the jury to acquit his client. Id.
109. Seditious libel is the common law crime "committed by words or writings that do
not amount to treason but are nonetheless critical of government officials or their policies." L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 861 (2d ed. 1988).
110. Id.
111. TRIBE, supra note 109, at 861.
112. CONSTITUTIOINAL LAW, supra note 98, at 834. An enlightening history of the Sedi-
tion Act of 1798 is given by Justice Brennan in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 273-79 (1964). The act made it a crime, punishable by a $5,000 fine and five years in
prison, for all false, scandalous and malicious writings or utterances against the government.
Id. at 273. President Jefferson eventually pardoned those convicted and sentenced under the
act and remitted their fines. Id. at 276.
113.' For an excellent chronology of freedom and restraint, see generally H. NELSON,
supra note 100. According to the chronology, under the Espionage Act of 1917 and other
related legislation, almost 2,000 people were prosecuted, resulting in nearly 900 convictions.
114. MEDIA & THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 10, at 4.
115. W. HACHTEN, THE SUPREME COURT ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 306 (1st ed.
1968).
116. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 140-41, 154-57.
118. See infra notes 145, 157-59.
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a defendant's right to a fair trial against a newspaper's right to report on
that trial has resulted in few restrictions being imposed on this right of
press access."1 9 By necessity, this general right of access includes a right to
attend most judicial proceedings.1 20 Traditional judicial openness normally
is not limited to the trial proper, but extends to various ancillary proceed-
ings, including pretrial hearings.221 Judicial openness also does not stop at
the conclusion of a judicial proceeding. For example, the press may be al-
lowed to interview trial jurors following their discharge from jury duty.122
The Supreme Court never has held that the press and public may be affirm-
atively prohibited from putting questions to petit jurors after trial.123 The
Supreme Court, however, never has addressed the issue in the context of
the grand jury.
The right of access to judicial proceedings historically has been based
on two constitutional foundations-the first and sixth amendments.12 In
cases before the Supreme Court, the first amendment argument has been
persuasive, whereas the sixth amendment argument has been rejected." 5
The Supreme Court recognizes that news gathering is an activity protected
by the first amendment. 26 This protection also extends to a newspaper's
right to publish information it has gathered.1 7 The Supreme Court is by no
means alone in its belief that the media has a first amendment right to
attend and publish information regarding judicial proceedings. Legal writ-
ers and judges alike have taken the position that the first amendment pro-
vides a right to attend judicial hearings. 28 A right of attendance comports
119. Sharp, supra note 21, at 384.
120. Id.
121. Note, The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1308 (1978).
122. See generally Sharp, supra note 21; Note, supra note 73.
123. Note, supra note 73, at 900. Though this statement refers only to petit jurors, a
like view could be taken in regard to grand jurors, due to the similarities of the two. United
States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 294 (N.D. Cal. 1952). For a further comparison of the
roles of petit and grand juries, see supra notes 54, 71-73.
124. Note, Peering Into the Courtroom: An Analysis of the Public Interest, 15 VAL.
U.L. REV. 371, 372 (1981).
125. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); see also Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Stevens J., concurring).
126. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). The court noted that "without
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could le eviscerated." Id.
127. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
128. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)(holding the right
to attend criminal trials is implicit in guarantees of the first amendment); United States v.
Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 862 (3d Cir. 1978)(Gibbons, J., concurring)(holding there is a first
amendment right of access to judicial proceedings); State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers v. Phil-
lips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 351 N.E.2d 127 (1976)(holding that a court order excluding the
press from a judicial hearing on motions to suppress evidence, and prohibiting newspapers
from publishing news reports of what would transpire at the hearing abridged the freedom of
the press on constitutional grounds); G. Fenner & J. Koley, The Rights of the Press and the
Closed Court Criminal Proceeding, 57 NEB. L. REv. 442, 454 (1978); Note, Trial Secrecy
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with the informational policies of the first amendment.'29
As previously noted, the sixth amendment 30 also has been used,
though less successfully, as the basis for providing the media with access to
the courtroom.' The unfavorable experience of secret trials' 2 resulted in
the sixth amendment guarantee of an accused's right to an open trial.' 3
Read literally, however, the sixth amendment guarantee of a public trial
applies only to the accused, not to the press or to the public. 34 Indeed,
more recent Supreme Court decisions have specifically rejected the use of
the sixth amendment as a basis for public right of access to judicial
proceedings.'
The accused, however, is not the only party interested in the fair ad-
ministration of justice. Other societal interests exist that require open tri-
als, 36 including protecting the integrity of the trial and guarding against
partiality on the part of the court. 3 7 Anything that impairs the open nature
and the First Amendment Right of Public Access to Judicial Proceedings, 91 HARV. L. REv.
1899 (1978).
129. Note, supra note 121, at 1314.
130. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
131. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
132. Secret trials have been blamed for improper convictions, as in the style of the Span-
ish Inquisition, as well as causing the general public to lose confidence in the judicial system.
The sixth amendment guarantee of an open trial was motivated by unfavorable experiences
with secret trials. Note, The "Right" to Observe Trials-Its Source and Vindication, 31 IND.
L.J. 377, 380 (1956).
133. Id.
134. Note, supra note 124, at 373.
135. See supra note 125. In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), the Court
explained that there is no doubt that the sixth amendment permits and even presumes open
trials as a norm. Id. However, the Court concluded history is insufficent to show the Framers
of the sixth amendment intended to create a constitutional right in strangers to attend judicial
proceedings (a pretrial proceeding in Gannett). Id. The sixth amendment, the Court said, was
intended only to confer upon the accused an explicit right to demand a public trial. Id.
136. As the Court noted in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the
open process of justice can serve an important prophylactic purpose for a community feeling
outrage after a shocking crime occurs. "The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration
of justice cannot function in the dark; no community catharsis can occur if justice is 'done in a
corner [or] in any covert manner.'" Id. at 571.
137. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 427 (1979). Other societal interests in
the public trial found by the Court in Gannett to exist separately from, and at times in opposi-
tion to, the interests of the accused include: the protection against perjury; the possibility that
publicity might cause unknown witnesses to make themselves known; deciding criminal prose-
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of judicial proceedings threatens to undermine the public confidence and
impede the ability of the courts to function.138 Based on these ideas and
concerns, the first amendment, and the fears that led to the drafting of the
sixth amendment, can be used to provide the media with a solid constitu-
tional basis for obtaining access to the judicial arena."3 9
This increased judicial acceptance enjoyed by the press is reflected in
several significant Supreme Court cases. Each of these cases illustrates the
extent to which the courts have gone to protect press access to the legal
system.1 40 The difficulty lies in balancing the press' rights of access against
the defendant's right to a fair trial, in that the zealous and inflammatory
publicity the press sometimes produces can cause unfavorable results,
among them potential juror bias resulting in reversals of convictions."' De-
cutions on truthful and complete records; allowing the public to scrutinize the performance of
police and prosecutors in the conduct of public judicial business; and education. Id. at 427-28.
138. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 429.
139. See generally United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978)(Gibbons, J.,
concurring). In Cianfrani, the court stressed the need to find a right of access on broader
grounds than the sixth amendment alone. Justice Gibbons suggests that a right of access exists
in the federal common law implied from the first amendment. Id. at 862.
140. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984)(holding
that the trial judge in a rape and murder trial could not constitutionally close all but three
days of six weeks of voir dire to protect privacy interests of prospective jurors). But see infra
note 141 and accompanying text. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596
(1982)(holding as a violation of the first amendment a statute that required exclusion of the
press and the public from trials for specified sexual offenses involving victims under the age of
18, during testimony of that victim); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980)(holding that absent an overriding interest articulated in the findings, the trial of a
criminal case must be open to the public); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976)(overturning a court order in a multiple murder case that had restrained the news me-
dia from publishing or broadcasting facts "strongly implicative" of the defendant, such as
confessions and admissions).
141. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)(excessive and prejudicial publicity
resulted in reversal of the defendant's conviction for murder); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U.S. 368 (1979)(holding that the press did not have an affirmative right of access to a pretrial
proceeding of a murder prosecution); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965)(holding that the
televising over petitioner's objections of the courtroom proceedings of petitioner's criminal trial
for swindling was inherently invalid as infringing the fundamental right to a fair trial); Rideau
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963)(holding it was a denial of due process of law to refuse the
request for a change of venue after the community had been exposed repeatedly and in depth
to the spectacle of the petitioner, arrested on kidnapping, armed robbery and murder charges,
personally confessing in detail to the crimes with which he later was charged); Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717 (1961)(holding that the defendant's conviction was void, due to the extreme
publicity, including alleged confessions, surrounding his arrest for six murders); Marshall v.
Untied States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959)(holding that exposure of some jurors during trial to news-
paper articles concerning prior convictions of the defendant.for practicing medicine without a
license when the trial court had refused to permit the prosecution to introduce such evidence
was so prejudicial as to entitle the defendant to a new trial). In Sheppard, the Supreme Court
reversed the conviction of a doctor who had been found guilty of murdering his wife. Shep-
pard, 384 U.S. at 333. The Court held that the trial judge failed to properly protect the jurors,
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spite these concerns, the Supreme Court has held that there was no per se
constitutional prohibition against radio, television, and still photographic
coverage of a criminal trial for public broadcast, notwithstanding the objec-
tion of the accused.1 42
While the question of accessibility to the courtroom often is couched in
terms of the press' first amendment rights, the first amendment generally
does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to infor-
mation not available to the public generally.1 43 Yet the trend shown in re-
cent cases decided by the Supreme Court has been to hold in favor of open
courtrooms. Because many of these cases involved the media, a growing
acceptance of the press by the judiciary is evident. For example, in Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart144 the Court held that pretrial publicity, even
pervasive, adverse publicity, does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial. 45 In
Gannett v. DePasquale,246 the Supreme Court noted that while the sixth
amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a public trial, it
does not guarantee the right to compel a private trial.,
47
A year after deciding Gannett, the Supreme Court held in Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia1 48 that absent an overriding interest149 articulated
in the findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public.150 In
defendants and witnesses from the enormous publicity generated by the celebrated case. Id.
Typical of some of the tabloid-style headlines that appeared in the papers were: "Blood Is
found In Garage;" "New Murder Evidence Is Found, Police Claim;" and "Dr. Sam Faces
Quiz At Jail on Marilyn's Fear Of Him." Id. at 342. Yet even the Sheppard decision states
that a responsible press "has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field." Id. at 350. The court went on to mention the
press' "impressive record of service over several centuries." Id.
142. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981). But see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965)(reaching a different conclusion on a similar issue of media coverage and the defend-
ant's objections thereto).
143. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972).
144. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
145. Id. at 554. In Nebraska Press Ass'n, the Court threw out an order by the trial
court, modified by the state supreme court, that restrained the media from publishing or
broadcasting accounts of confessions or admissions made by the defendant charged with multi-
ple murders. Id. at 539. The order also prohibited publication of other facts "strongly implica-
tive" of the defendant. Id. at 568.
146. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
147. Id. at 382. But note that the general holding of the case was that orders excluding
members of the public and the press from pretrial suppression hearings, and temporarily deny-
ing access to a transcript of the suppression hearing, when done to insure the defendant a fair
trial, do not violate the press' rights under the first and fourteenth amendments. Id.
148. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
149. The court in Richmond Newspapers declined to define exactly what constitutes an
"overriding interest." Id. at 581. The Court said it had no reason to define the circumstances
in which all or parts of a criminal trial may be closed to the public, but explicitly stated that
the press' first amendment rights of access are not absolute. Id. at 582 n.18.
150. Id. at 581. In Richmond Newspapers, the Court reversed an order by the trial
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reviewing the historical public access to trials,15' the Court stressed that
openness is important to assure a proper functioning trial.1" 2 Openness gives
the assurance that proceedings are conducted fairly to all concerned, and it
discourages perjury, misconduct of participants, and decisions based on se-
cret bias or partiality. 53
With the press thus receiving greater access to the courthouse, the Su-
preme Court in 1982 decided Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,'"
holding that to justify the exclusion of the press and public from criminal
trials, the state must show that closure is necessitated by a compelling gov-
ernmental interest 55 and is narrowly tailored 56 to serve that interest. 157
More recently, the Court extended first amendment protections even fur-
ther in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,53 holding that the guaran-
tees of open criminal proceedings also apply to voir dire examinations. 59
court judge that excluded the press and the public from the defendant's murder trial.
151. It should be noted that a key distinction between petit and grand juries is this
historical openness. Thus, the evolution of press interviews of petit jurors is in accord with the
open nature of these proceedings. In contrast, grand juries operate in secret. This distinction,
though important, should not be sufficient to undermine the arguments for press access to
grand juries. In fact, an historical analysis arguably supports the case for grand jury access.
When grand juries originated in England, the proceedings were open to the public, and the
adoption of secrecy was designed more to protect the grand jury from the government than to
promote the government's interest. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. Further-
more, the fifth amendment, the source of the American grand jury, does not contain a secrecy
requirement. For the entire text of the fifth amendment, see supra note 13.
152. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 578.
153. Id. at 569.
154. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
155. A compelling governmental interest has been defined by the Supreme Court as the
"highest form of interest." Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1978). This
is a difficult test to meet. For example, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975), the Supreme Court held that the state interest of protecting the privacy right of a rape
victim was insufficient to prohibit a newspaper from publishing the rape victim's name. Id. at
497.
156. A measure is narrowly tailored when there exists no less drastic means to achieve
the intended purpose. The Supreme Court in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596 '(1982), held a mandatory closure order overbroad, and instead required the trial
court to use a case-by-case approach. Id. at 609. Such an approach, the Court reasoned, en-
sures that the constitutional right of the press and the public will not be restricted except
where absolutely necessary to protect the state's interest. Id. Such an approach necessarily
gives the press an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 609 n.25.
157. Id. at 607. In Globe, the Court found a Massachusetts statute violated the first
amendment. The statute required trial judges, at trials for specified sexual offenses involving
victims under the age of 18, to exclude the press and the public fropi the courtroom during
testimony of that victim. The Court held the "flat ban" provisions of the statute unconstitu-
tional and instead required a "case-by-case" analysis. Id. at 610-11.
158. 464 U.S. 501 (1984). This case, referred to as Press-Enterprise I, must be distin-
guished from Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986), referred to as Press-
Enterprise I.
159. Id. In Press-Enterprise I, the trial judge was reversed, by writ of mandamus, in his
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Despite the difficult constitutional questions involved, these cases illus-
trate that the Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized the importance of
avoiding secrecy in judicial proceedings. Closure orders are looked upon
with extreme disfavor and will be strictly scrutinized.160 Mandatory closure
orders are avoided."" Accordingly, rules threatening contempt for inter-
viewing"16 grand jurors are in conflict with the trend of Supreme Court
cases stressing the necessity of including the press in the judicial process.168
This trend should be carried to its logical conclusion by allowing the media
free access to grand jurors after the jurors have been discharged from their
judicial duties.
IV. STRIKING A BALANCE
A. Extent of Grand Jury Secrecy Unclear
Not everything relating to a grand jury proceeding falls within the rule
of secrecy. Grand jury secrecy is not absolute, but rather Rule 6(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has built-in exceptions that lift the
veil of secrecy.' 4 These exceptions add to the confusion of determining
what aspects of grand jury proceedings may be properly disclosed. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has said that after the grand jury's functions are
completed, disclosure of grand jury testimony is "wholly proper where the
ends of justice require it."' 65 The Court's opinion, however, fails to define
when the ends of justice require disclosure.
Rule 6(e) also lacks sufficient specificity, extending the policy of se-
crecy only to "matters occurring before the grand jury."'66 If the disclosure
attempt to close the voir dire proceedings in a rape and murder trial, and to prohibit the
release of a transcript of the proceedings. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 505.
160. See supra note 140.
161. Globe, 457 U.S. at 608.
162. The typical interview would involve one or more media representatives asking a
juror what occurred during the grand jury proceedings. The likely focus of these questions
would be on who the target of the investigation was, what evidence was presented against this
person, whether the grand jury returned an indictment, and how the grand jurors voted. Obvi-
ously, the jurors could refuse to answer some or all of the questions.
163. As noted earlier, the holdings in these cases are based in part on the historical
openness of judicial proceedings. See related discussion supra note 151.
164. In re Grand Jury Matter, 682 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1982). See infra notes 166-76
and accompanying text.
165. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940). Obviously,
the Socony-Vaccum case is dated. The case, however, remains good law, paticularly because
the oath regarding grand jury secrecy has changed so little over the years. See supra note 1.
166. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). This rule expressly provides that disclosures otherwise
prohibited of matters occurring before the grand jury, may be made to: an attorney for the
government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty; or such government personnel
(including personnel of a state or subdivision of a state) as are deemed necessary by an attor-
ney for the government to assist an attorney for the government in the performance of such
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of a particular item would not reveal "matters occurring before the grand
jury," Rule 6(e) does not apply, and thus disclosure is not in any way re-
stricted by the principles of grand jury secrecy.167 Evidence obtained inde-
pendently of the grand jury does not ordinarily constitute a "matter occur-
ring before the grand jury" even if the same witness or similar evidence has
been or will be presented to the grand jury. 68 The test used in determining
whether documents are included within the reach of the secrecy provisions
is whether the documents tend to reveal what transpired before the grandjury. 269
In addition, it is now settled law that Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure does not prevent disclosures by a grand jury witness of
what transpired in the grand jury room during the witness' presence."'
Rule 6(e)(2)17 L does not expressly impose a secrecy obligation on grand
jury witnesses.117  Thus, a witness who has testified before a federal grand
jury may subsequently discuss his or her testimony with others, including
the media. It is less clear whether a witness is entitled to a transcript of his
or her own testimony as a matter of right, absent a showing of need, but the
majority of courts prohibit such disclosure as unnecessary.171
Under appropriate conditions, the secrecy requirement also may be re-
attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law. Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of
matters occurring before the grand jury may also be made: when so directed by a court pre-
liminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding; when permitted by a court at the
request of the defendant, upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the
indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury; when the disclosure is made by
an attorney for the government to another federal grand jury; or when permitted by a court at
the request of an attorney for the government, upon a showing that such matters may disclose
a violation of state criminal law, to an appropriate official of a state or subdivision of a state
for the purpose of enforcing such law. If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring
before the grand jury, the disclosure shall be made in such a manner, at such time, and under
such conditions as the court may direct.
167. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 1, § 7:06, at 26.
168. In re Grand Jury Matter, 682 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1982).
169. United States v. Armco Steel Co., 458 F. Supp. 784, 790 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
170. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 610 F.2d 202, 217 (5th Cir. 1980).
171. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). This provision deals with the general rule of secrecy. It
states in relevant part:
A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a
typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any other
person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall
not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in
these rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance
with this rule.
Id.
172. M. David, A. Lengyel, C. Manuelian & P. Sutko, The Federal Grand Jury: Prac-
tice & Procedure, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1981).
173. See Bast v. United States, 542 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1976); In re Alvarez, 351 F.
Supp. 1089 (S.D. Cal. 1972); but see In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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laxed to allow a party who was not a witness access to a transcript of a
prior grand jury proceeding. 74 The party seeking disclosure must satisfy
three requirements. 7 5 First, the party seeking disclosure must show that the
material sought is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial
proceeding. Second, the party must show that the need to disclose the
materials is greater than the need for continued secrecy. Third, the party
must show that the request is structured to cover only necessary material.
When a party meets these three requirements, secrecy may be relaxed and
access to grand jury transcripts may be granted. 7 6
Whether the exceptions to grand jury secrecy encompass the right to
interview jurors after completion of proceedings in a particular case re-
mains unsettled. Some cases have held that secrecy is absolute and forever
binding.177 Other cases have followed the trend of relaxed secrecy and held
that disclosure may be proper under particular circumstances, such as dis-
174. A typical example of this situation is a person who is indicted by a grand jury, but
did not appear before it. This person may attempt to obtain a copy of the grand jury transcript
to try to quash the indictment, to bring about inconsistencies in testimony, or to otherwise aid
in his or her defense.
175. In re Grand Jury Matter, 682 F.2d 61, 63-64 (3d Cir. 1982)(citing Douglas Oil
Co. v. Petro Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979)).
176. Id. Cases emphasizing this three-part test generally do not involve the press. For
example, In re Grand Jury Matter involved a request by a state district attorney for disclosure
of grand jury materials.
177. In United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 26 F. Supp. 429 (D.D.C. 1939), the
court held that the grand jurors' oath of secrecy is not limited by time or circumstance, "but is
a lasting obligation binding all who have served as grand jurors." Id. at 430. In Matter of
Grand Jury v. United States, 239 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1956), the court held that secrecy contin-
ues even after the grand jury has completed its efforts. Id. at 272. In a case involving newspa-
per reports of grand jury activities, the court held that newspaper disclosures of what occurred
before the grand jury, obtained either by direct statement or by collection of circumstantial
evidence, is an interference with grand jury proceedings. United States v. Providence Tribune
Co., 241 F. 524, 526 (D.R.I. 1917). Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1939),
held that a grand juror may be held in contempt for disclosing grand jury proceedings to an
outsider. Id. at 519.
A recent Indiana Court of Appeals decision is directly on point. In Indiana v. Heltzel &
Kiesling, 533 N.E.2d 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), the court held an action for indirect contempt
could lie against two newspaper reporters who attempted to induce grand jurors to divulge
information regarding the proceedings. The court dismissed the reporters' claims of first
amendment right of access. Id. at 160. The court stated "the questioning of former grand
jurors about secret grand jury evidence, deliberations and notes invades the sanctity of the
grand jury, offends the administration of justice and impairs the operation of court proceed-
ings." Id. The court, however, cited little authority for its position. Furthermore, only the
concurring opinion of Chief Justice Ratliff addressed the key issue that the grand jury session
involved in the case had been concluded. Id. at 162. Attorneys for the reporters filed a petition
for rehearing February 13, 1989. This petition was denied March 21 by a 3-0 vote. A petition
for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court was filed April 10. This petition had not been ruled
on at the time of publication.
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charge of the grand jury. 78 All of the federal cases on point are somewhat
dated, and ripe for reevalutation and harmonization. The Supreme Court
has never ruled directly on this issue. Other judges, however, have acknowl-
edged that since the adoption of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, cases have had widely differing interpretations of the rule's dis-
closure provision.17 9 The result is a chaotic assortment of case law on the
issue and a need for reform so that courts, grand jurors, and the press have
a clear understanding of how far grand jury secrecy reaches.
B. Keeping An Eye On The Media
The unclarity surrounding grand jury secrecy and its exceptions should
not be resolved in favor of giving the media unchecked access to every facet
of the judicial arena. Though many members of the press perform their
duties professionally, examples abound of over-zealous press members.1 80
An unbridled media poses potential problems in this area, as postverdict
interrogation of jurors presents a very real threat to the individual juror's
right to privacy.181 The Supreme Court, however, has stated that infringe-
ment upon first amendment rights is only justified in the most exceptional
cases.
18 2
It is paramount that courts and jurors not be subjected to a media-
imposed carnival atmosphere.183 A balance must be struck that would allow
the press greater access to grand jury proceedings, while protecting both
jurors' privacy and defendants' rights to fair trials. Freedom to report the
178. Atwell v. United States, 162 F. 97 (4th Cir. 1908), held that the law does not
require a grand juror to keep the evidence adduced in a grand jury room secret after the
presentment and indictment has been found and made public, the accused has been appre-
hended and the grand jury finally discharged. Id. at 101. Metzler v. United States, 64 F.2d
203 (9th Cir. 1933), held that after the indictment has been found and made public and the
defendants apprehended, secrecy loses its importance to the function of the grand jury. Id. at
206. And in Howard v. State, 60 Ga. App. 229, 4 S.E.2d 418 (1939), the court held that it did
not violate grand jury secrecy for the grand jury foreman to give a statement published in all
the Atlanta newspapers regarding the nature of the grand jury investigation. Id. at 235, 4
S.E.2d at 423.
179. In re Report of Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974).
180. See supra note 141.
181. Sharp, supra note 21, at 381.
182. Worell Newspapers of Indiana v. Westhafer, 739 F.2d 1219, 1223 (7th Cir.
1984)(discussing several Supreme Court cases with first amendment issues).
183. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966). At one point in its opinion the
Court describes a portion of the first day of the trial, during which the jury viewed the scene of
the murder. The opinion states that hundreds of reporters. cameramen and onlookers were
there, and one representative of the news media was permitted to accompany the jury while it
inspected the Sheppard home. Id. The time of the jury's visit was revealed so far in advance
that one of the newspapers was able to rent a helicopter and fly over the house taking pictures
of the jurors on their tour. Id.
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news must necessarily carry with it a regard and concern for the rights of
others whose interests may conflict with those of the press.1 '4 Assuming
other citizens' rights are respected, the responsibility for relaxing the rule of
grand jury secrecy and supervising any subsequent inquiry resides in the
sound discretion of the court of which the grand jury is a part.'85
V. ALLOWING INTERVIEWS OF GRAND JURORS
Many writers have criticized grand jury secrecy, 88 and there is mount-
ing support for significant changes in traditional grand jury procedure. 8 '
One change that would safeguard against abuses of grand jury secrecy, pro-
tect the public's interest, and secure faith in the judicial system would be to
afford the media the opportunity to freely interview grand jurors upon com-
pletion of grand jury proceedings.
Using secrecy to prevent the press from interviewing grand jurors has
the effect of producing a type of mandatory closure order, an effect the
Supreme Court has expressly rejected.'88 A better approach is to use a
case-by-case analysis, 89 whereby a judge can scrutinize the competing in-
terests involved and make a more informed and practical ruling than would
result under a blanket closure interpretation of grand jury secrecy. A viable
solution to the issue of what media contact with grand jurors is permissible
can be reached by synthesizing the approach used in Globe, supplemented
by that used in Bridges v. State of California.90 The by-product of such a
synthesis is a four-part test to determine if the media should be denied
access to grand jurors.
The proposed four-part test would be supplemented by an important,
initial distinction between cases in which an indictment is issued and cases
where one is not. Although completion of deliberations and the issuing of an
indictment does not always eliminate all need for secrecy,' 9 ' common sense
dictates that when an indictment is returned the media will learn the facts
of the case as the case proceeds through the judicial process. As one court
stated, if the citizen is indicted, the reason for secrecy ends; if no indict-
ment is issued, the cloak of secrecy remains in place.' 9 ' Thus, where an
184. W. HACHTEN, supra note 115, at 306.
185. Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394, 397 (6th Cir. 1940).
186. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
187. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 1, § 1:09, at 39. See also supra notes 95-96 and
accompanying text.
188. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
189. In Globe, the Court stated, "[a] trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis
whether closure is necessary" to protect the interest involved. Id. at 608.
190. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
191. United States v. Sobotka, 623 F.2d 764, 767 (2d Cir. 1980).
192. Application of Jordon, 439 F. Supp. 199, 202 (S.D.W. Va. 1977).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 [1989], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss3/9
GRAND JURY SECRECY
indictment has been issued, the grand jury has completed its duties as to
the particular case, and the defendant has been apprehended, the press
should be free to interview the grand jurors. Prohibiting such interviews
would at best merely delay the dissemination of information that likely
would become public in the near future. At worst, the prohibition could
violate important first amendment rights while keeping from the public in-
formation citizens have an interest in knowing.
In all other cases where an indictment is issued,193 the four-part test
should be applied. The first part of the test would require that the prosecu-
tor or other individual seeking closure show a compelling governmental in-
terest '94 that would be protected by preventing grand juror interviews. This
burden would be difficult to meet, but should not be insurmountable in in-
stances where closure is truly merited. Under the second part of the test,
there would have to be reasonable grounds to fear that serious evil would
result if the interviews occurred.195 The third prong of the test would re-
quire that there be reasonable grounds to believe that the danger appre-
hended is imminent.'96 The fourth part of the test would require that if a
compelling enough interest exists so as to restrict the media, this restriction
must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.197 In cases involving an
issued indictment, the presumption should be in favor of allowing press in-
terviews of grand jurors. To overcome this presumption, the prosecutor
seeking the restriction must clearly meet each step of the Globe-Bridges
analysis. When no indictment issues, the tables should be reversed; the pre-
sumption should be in favor of prohibiting interviews of grand jurors. In
these cases, it should be the press that must show a compelling interest and
otherwise satisfy the inverted four-part test in order to gain access to grand
jurors. This reversal, which would be nearly impossible for the press to
overcome, would preserve the grand jury's historic purpose of protecting the
innocent from public ridicule. 98
Since the court of which the grand jury is a part'9 9 has the responsibil-
193. Two common examples are when the defendant has not yet been apprehended and
when the grand jury remains in session to hear information on a case unrelated to the jurors'
prior deliberations.
194. Globe, 457 U.S. at 607. It should be emphasized that this would be a tough burden
to meet. In Globe, safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of minors who tes-
tify in sex crimes cases was not found to a sufficiently compelling interest to justify mandatory
closure of portions of the accused's criminal trial. Id. at 608. The test for infringing upon the
press' first amendment rights and denying access to grand jurors should be no less stringent.
195. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 262.
196. Id.
197. Globe, 457 U.S. at 607.
198. See supra text accompanying note 66.
199. The grand jury is an appendage of the court within the jurisdiction it sits, and its
jurisdiction is coextensive with the court's and cannot exceed it. Application of United Electri-
cal, Radio and Mach. Workers, Ill F. Supp. 858, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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ity for relaxing the rule of grand jury secrecy,200 it would be within that
court's discretion to determine whether the test has been satisfied. In addi-
tion, should the media feel grand juror interviews have been restricted with-
out the four-part test being satisfied, an action for mandamus should lie
against the judge issuing the restrictive order.201 This check is especially
important, since the use of extraordinary writs has been carefully limited in
the federal courts.202
To illustrate the test in a hypothetical situation, assume a grand jury is
hearing evidence regarding an alleged illegal drug smuggling operation. If
the grand jury returns indictments against those whom the prosecutor
hoped to charge, the press should be free to interview the grand jury mem-
bers upon discharge of the grand jury and apprehension of the suspects. If
no indictments are issued, the burden would be on the press to show a com-
pelling interest in disclosure. This requirement, combined with the three
remaining hurdles in the Globe-Bridges analysis, 208 would almost certainly
curtail press access to the grand jurors. Assuming indictments are issued
but the suspects have not been apprehended, the burden would be on the
prosector to satisfy the four-part test in order to prohibit press interviews of
grand jurors. To satisfy the test, the prosecution would argue it had a com-
pelling interest in nondisclosure in that serious evil-the fleeing, perhaps
out of the country, of the suspects-would result if the interviews were al-
lowed. That is, if the press published the details of the grand jury investiga-
tion, the suspects would be alerted and would be able to avoid police cap-
ture. Because of the seriousness of the drug charges, the prosecutor could
argue that flight of the suspects is imminent. Assuming further the judge
deciding whether to prohibit the interviews held against the press, an action
for mandamus would lie to challenge the decision.
200. Schmidt v. U.S., 115 F.2d 394, 397 (6th Cir. 1940).
201. A writ of mandamus is an original proceeding, not an appeal, in the appellate court
seeking an order directing the trial judge to enter or vacate a particular order. J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 595 (1985). Thus, a writ of man-
damus could be used to order a judge to rescind an improperly issued order restricting the
media from interviewing grand jurors. Issues of press standing to bring a mandamus action or
otherwise challenge a denial of access to grand jury information are not problematic. The press
has standing to intervene in actions to which it is otherwise not a party in order to petition for
access to court proceedings and records. Petition of Tribune Co., 784 F.2d 1518, 1521 (1lth
Cir. 1986).
202. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 595 (1985).
203. Obviously when the burden is on the press to prove that contact with the grand jury
should be allowed, the exact terminology of the Globe-Bridges analysis must be altered
slightly. However, the four-part test remains generally the same. The first part of the test
would require that the press show a compelling interest that would be infringed upon by
prohibiting interviews with grand jurors. Under the second part of the test, there would have to
be reasonable grounds to fear that serious evil would result if the interviews did not occur. The
third and fourth prongs of the test would not change.
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The benefits of adopting this proposal are numerous. For example, the
proposal strengthens press freedoms in the judicial arena, a result in accor-
dance with the spirit of the first amendment. In addition, the proposal ex-
pands the watchdog functions of the press to include grand jury operations.
This expansion should serve to minimize abuses of the grand jury process,
as prosecutors will realize their previously secret activities will be subject to
public scrutiny. Just as important, the proposal establishes much-needed
guidelines for press-grand jury contact, thus providing citizens who serve as
grand jurors a concrete measure of what contacts are permissible. Not only
will this avoid jurors' running afoul of the secrecy requirements and thus
being subjected to contempt actions, the proposal avoids any incidental chil-
ling effect the secrecy requirements have on the press by replacing ambigu-
ity with a specific, four-part test. The proposal, however, is not without
drawbacks. For one thing, it makes public a system that has not been asso-
ciated with the tradition of openness of other judicial proceedings. In addi-
tion, the suggested case-by-case analysis will require careful judicial inspec-
tion to determine whether the elements of the Globe-Bridges analysis have
been satisfied. In the final analysis, however, the proposal adequately bal-
ances all interests involved while making significant changes in traditional
grand jury procedure demanded by critics of the system. 04
VI. CONCLUSION
Allowing the press a limited right to interview grand jurors upon com-
pletion of the grand jury proceedings is a proper and needed reform of the
grand jury system. Interpreting grand jury secrecy as an absolute bar to
post-proceeding interviews may infringe upon first amendment rights. The
first amendment zealously protects important journalistic freedoms,205 and
one of the most important of these freedoms is the right to report on the
judiciary.
History attests that mankind is prone to abuse power.2'0 Allowing pros-
ecutors to hide their potential abuse of the grand jury system behind an
impenetrable cloak of secrecy only feeds the fires of abuse. By allowing the
press some contact with grand jurors, prosecutors will be held more ac-
countable for their sometimes questionable methods used in carrying out
investigations and obtaining indictments.
The free press, enjoying increased acceptance by the judiciary, is vital
to a strong democracy. °0 Prohibiting reporters from talking with grand ju-
204. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
205. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
206. H. NELSON, supra note 100, at 15.
207. As Justice Brandeis stated in his famous concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927): "[F]reedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indis-
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rors upon their discharge is an impermissible restriction in light of the ide-
als with which the first amendment was conceived. Using the foregoing
four-part analysis will not destroy grand jury secrecy. Rather, the proposed
test will provide a much-needed check on unbearable abuses in the judicial
system. At the same time, the analysis provides a means by which press
access can be curtailed, if necessary, to protect compelling governmental
interests.
TIM A. BAKER
pensable to the discovery and spread of political truth ...." Id. at 375.
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